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NOTES
ROBERTS v. UNITED STATES JA YCEES:
DISCRIMINATORY MEMBERSHIP POLICY OF
A NATIONAL ORGANIZATION HELD NOT
PROTECTED BY FIRST AMENDMENT
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
Freedom of association, though not explicit in the Constitution, is a judi-
cially recognized right deriving constitutional protection from its nexus with
freedom of speech and expression under the first amendment.1 The concept
of freedom of association, however, is flawed by an inherent and irreconcila-
ble tension: the right to choose with whom one will associate presupposes a
commensurate right to choose with whom one will not associate.2 When a
1. Since 1958 the Supreme Court has consistently recognized the existence of a constitu-
tional right of association. See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459
U.S. 87, 91 (1982); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 908 (1982); Citizens
Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295
(1981); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 431 (1978); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,
233 (1977); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15
(1976); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487-88 (1975); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181
(1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1960); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486
(1960); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
2. In his dissent in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), Justice Douglas
asserted:
The associational rights which our system honors permit all white, all black, all
brown, and all yellow clubs to be formed. They also permit all Catholic, all Jewish,
or all agnostic clubs to be established. Government may not tell a man or woman
who his or her associates must be. The individual can be as selective as he desires.
Id. at 179-80. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 313 (1964), wherein Justice Goldberg, in a
concurring opinion, emphasized that:
Prejudice and bigotry in any form are regrettable, but it is the constitutional right of
every person to close his home or club to any person or to choose his social intimates
and business partners solely on the basis of personal prejudices including race. These
and other rights pertaining to privacy and private association are themselves consti-
tutionally protected liberties.
Id. Cf Note, Section 1981 and Private Groups: The Right to Discriminate Versus Freedom
From Discrimination, 84 YALE L.J. 1441, 1455-57 (1975) (arguing that despite dicta in
Supreme Court cases like Bell v. Maryland and Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, there is no direct
precedent for the proposition that private groups have a constitutional right to discriminate).
See generally infra text accompanying notes 95-125.
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private all-male club discriminates on the basis of gender, this tension is re-
vealed in the conflict between the interest in freedom of exclusive association
claimed by men who are included and the interest in gaining access asserted
by women who are excluded. It has long been the rule that truly private
clubs are free to discriminate on the basis of any criteria they choose.
Where the allegedly private club is found not to be truly private, however,
the issue becomes whether the right of association will continue to protect
the group's discriminatory practices from government sanctions.
This was precisely the situation confronted in Roberts v. United States
Jaycees.4 On the one hand, the Minnesota Human Rights Act prohibited
gender discrimination in "place[s] of public accommodation" 5 and the Min-
nesota Supreme Court certified that the Jaycees was a place of public accom-
modation within the meaning of the Act.6 On the other hand, the national
organization of the Jaycees defended its policy of excluding women from
membership on the basis of its constitutional right to freedom of associa-
tion.7 The issue confronted by the United States Supreme Court was
whether the state statute as applied to the Jaycees, compelling them to ac-
cept women as full voting members, was a violation of the male members'
first amendment freedom of association.'
The United States Jaycees (Jaycees) is a national organization whose by-
laws limit full membership to men aged eighteen to thirty-five; women and
older men are eligible only for associate membership.9 Female associate
members are not allowed to vote, run for any office, or receive achievement
awards.O Moreover, no criteria other than age and gender are employed by
3. Private clubs are specifically exempted from title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
which prohibits racial discrimination in places of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e)
(1982 & Supp. 11983). Moreover, state antidiscrimination laws, patterned after the federal act
either explicitly or implicitly exclude private clubs from coverage. See infra note 104.
4. 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984).
5. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(3) (West 1982). The provision states "[i]t is an unfair
discriminatory practice: To deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, serv-
ices, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public accommodation
because of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national origin or sex." Id.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.02(18) (West 1982) provides that a place of public accommoda-
tion means "a business, accommodation, refreshment, entertainment, recreation, or transpor-
tation facility of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, privileges,
advantages or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the
public." Id.
6. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Minn. 1981).
7. See United States Jaycees v. McClure, 534 F. Supp. 766, 768 (D. Minn. 1982), rev'd,
709 F.2d 1560 (8th Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244
(1984).
8. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. at 3246.
9. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 534 F. Supp. at 769.
10. Id.
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the Jaycees in the selection of members.1" The avowed purpose of the
Jaycees organization is to train young men for civic and business leadership
and the Jaycees assert that this training provides its members with an advan-
tage in business and community advancement. 12 A primary activity of the
Jaycees is the sale of memberships through continuous recruitment of new
members.1 3 As one court concluded, "[t]he Jaycees itself refers to its mem-
bers as customers and membership as a product it is selling."14
A lengthy series of administrative proceedings were held on the state level
culminating in the Minnesota Supreme Court's certification that the Jaycees
organization was a place of public accommodation.15 Following the state
court's decision, the Jaycees renewed their complaint in the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota. The district court concluded
that Minnesota's interest in prohibiting gender discrimination outweighed
any interest in freedom of association asserted by the Jaycees.16 A divided
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and held, in
part, that the interest of the state was not sufficiently strong to override the
11. Id.
12. Id. at 769. The Jaycees bylaws state its purpose:
[To] promote and foster the growth and development of young men's civic organiza-
tions in the United States, designed to inculcate in the individual membership of such
organization a spirit of genuine Americanism and civic interest, and as a supplemen-
tary education institution to provide them with opportunity for personal develop-




15. See United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d at 764. The case arose from a
dispute between the national organization and two of its local chapters. See Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. at 3248. In violation of the Jaycees bylaws the Minneapolis and St.
Paul chapters had been admitting women as full members. Id. at 3247. They were advised
that revocation of their charters was being considered by the national organization. Id. at
3248. Both chapters filed charges of discrimination with the Minnesota Department of
Human Rights alleging a violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act. Id. The Commis-
sioner ordered a hearing before the state examiner. Id. At the same time, the national organi-
zation filed suit in the federal district court for the District of Minnesota seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of the Act. Id. The district court dismissed the
suit without prejudice pending the outcome of the state administrative proceeding. Id.
The hearing examiner concluded that the Jaycees organization was a "place of public ac-
commodation" within the meaning of the Act and that it had discriminated against women by
excluding them from full membership. Id. The examiner ordered the national organization to
terminate its discriminatory practices. Id. Consequently, the Jaycees renewed its complaint in
the district court and that court certified to the Minnesota Supreme Court the question
whether the Jaycees organization was a place of public accommodation. Id. The court an-
swered in the affirmative. Id.
16. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 534 F. Supp. 766, 774 (D. Minn. 1982). The court
found that Minnesota's interest in prohibiting gender discrimination in places of public accom-
modation was compelling. Id. at 771.
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Jaycees' constitutional right of association.
17
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,'" the Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the state's interest in eliminating gender-based discrimination justified
the impact that requiring the Jaycees to admit women may have on the male
members' freedom of association.19 The Court emphasized that Minnesota's
goal of providing its citizens equal access to publicly available goods, privi-
leges, and advantages was a compelling state interest and served to protect
its female citizens from a number of serious social and economic harms.2°
In addition, the Court rejected the organization's challenge that the Act, as
construed by the Minnesota Supreme Court, was unconstitutionally vague
and overbroad.2 In the Court's view, the state court employed specific and
objective criteria to determine whether the statute reached the Jaycees and
adopted a limiting construction that would exclude private clubs from the
Act's reach.
22
In her concurring opinion,23 Justice O'Connor agreed that applying the
Act to the Jaycees did not violate the first amendment, 24 but she criticized
the test used by the Court as "both over-protective of activities undeserving
of constitutional shelter and under-protective of important First Amend-
ment concerns.",25 As an alternative, she suggested an approach termed the
"expressive-commercial dichotomy."26 Under this analysis, a court's role
was to determine whether an association was predominantly commercial or
predominantly expressive. 27 In her view, the latter was entitled to full con-
stitutional protection and freedom from state interference while the former
was deserving of only minimal protection and subject to rational state
regulation.28
This Note will examine the legal framework providing a starting point for
the Supreme Court's opinion in Jaycees. The focus will be on the evolution
17. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1561 (8th Cir. 1983). Two judges
concluded that although the state's interest was compelling "in the general sense" of the word,
the state had not met its burden of demonstrating that the serious infringement of the Jaycees'
right of association was clearly justified. Id. at 1576.
18. 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984).
19. Id. at 3253.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 3256.
22. Id.
23. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun took no part in the decision. Justice
Rehnquist concurred in the judgment and there was no dissent.
24. 104 S. Ct. at 3257 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 3258-61.
27. Id. at 3259.
28. Id.
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of a constitutional right to associate for expressive purposes and on the ten-
tative formulation by the Court of a more limited right to be free from asso-
ciation. An analysis of the principal case will reveal the Supreme Court held
for the first time that eradicating public discrimination against women was a
compelling state interest and a state statute forcing the Jaycees to admit wo-
men did not violate its male members' freedom of association.
I. DEVELOPING TRENDS OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND FREEDOM
FROM ASSOCIATION
A. Evolution of the Doctrine of Freedom of Association
The freedom of association is fundamentally a right to associate with
others for expressive purposes.2 9 This right of expressive association is not
29. See the discussion of NAACP v. Alabama infra text accompanying notes 31-42. A
second and narrower corollary to the freedom of association is an associational right based on
the "right to privacy" that the Supreme Court has described as implicit in the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
Since Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court has consistently recognized
the existence of a right to privacy with respect to highly personal relationships and a freedom
of individual choice in certain matters of marriage, procreation, contraception, child rearing
and education, and family living arrangements. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978) (marriage); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (contraception);
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (cohabitation with relatives); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (procreation); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (contracep-
tion); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (marriage and contraception); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (child
rearing and education).
The Court has been unwilling, however, to extend the scope of this privacy right beyond
certain intimate, familial relationships and the important decisionmaking that accompanies
them. Compare Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (invalidating a statute prohibiting
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons) with Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney,
425 U.S. 901 (1976), affig mem., 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (upholding as not in
violation of the right to privacy a state law making sodomy a crime). Compare Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (sustaining a zoning ordinance that prohibited groups of
more than two unrelated individuals from living together, finding no violation of the privacy
right) with Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (nullifying a housing ordi-
nance that precluded certain groups of related individuals from living together as an infringe-
ment of freedom of choice in matters of child rearing and family living arrangements). See
generally Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balanc-
ing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 471 (1983) (focusing on whether
as a constitutional matter courts should recognize right to privacy claims by unrelated individ-
uals and groups who desire the same level of protection as that granted to relationships based
on marriage or kinship).
In any event, this associational right to privacy has never been applied to protect large
groups of unrelated individuals from governmental protection. See Burns, The Exclusion of
Women From Influential Men's Clubs: The Inner Sanctum and the Myth of Full Equality, 18
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 321, 347-48 (1983) ("There is no precedent... for the proposition
that the right of privacy encompasses the membership practices of a 'club with hundreds or
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specifically guaranteed by the first amendment to the Constitution.3 ° In
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,3 1 however, the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged for the first time the existence of such a right as derived by
implication from the first and fourteenth amendments.3 2 In that case, the
Supreme Court confronted the issue whether the state constitutionally could
compel the NAACP organization to reveal the names and addresses of all its
Alabama members. 3  A unanimous Court held that compelled disclosure of
the organization's membership lists abridged the members' freedom of
association.
34
Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, described the right as the "freedom
to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas," thus rec-
ognizing the close relationship between association and freedom of speech. 35
Further, the Court announced that state action curtailing the right would be
subject to the closest scrutiny. 6 Justice Harlan observed the NAACP had
made an unchallenged showing that in the past, disclosure of members' iden-
tities exposed them to economic sanctions such as the loss of employment,
threats of physical harm, and other indications of public antagonism. 7
Consequently, the Court concluded that compelled disclosure of the mem-
bership lists would be likely to impair the ability of the NAACP and its
members to express their collective voice.38
The Court next examined whether the state had demonstrated an interest
sufficiently "compelling" to justify the serious effect that disclosure could
have on the exercise of the NAACP's members' protected right of associa-
tion.39 The asserted purpose of the disclosure requirement was to determine
whether the NAACP was carrying on intrastate business in violation of the
thousands of members, where many members do not even know one another, much less lay
claim to an intimate personal relationship.' ").
30. The first amendment provides, in part, that: "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
31. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
32. Id. at 460.
33. Id. at 451.
34. Id. at 462-63.
35. Id. at 460. Because of this nexus between freedom of expression and freedom of asso-
ciation, the Court required an initial showing that the challenged governmental action re-
stricted the ability of the group to express itself.
36. Id. at 460-61.
37. Id. at 462.
38. Id. at 462-63. The Court reasoned that fear of exposure of members' beliefs revealed
through their identification with the organization would force them to withdraw from the
association and dissuade others from joining. Id.
39. Id. at 463.
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state's foreign corporation registration law.4° The Court was not persuaded
that disclosing the names of the NAACP's rank and file members would aid
the state in resolving this issue.4 1 The Court concluded, therefore, that the
state had failed to demonstrate a "controlling justification" for the adverse
effect disclosure would have on the members' constitutional right of
association.42
Supreme Court rulings since 1958 illustrate a number of ways govern-
ments have attempted to abridge the right of association: by imposing pen-
alties or withholding privileges from the members of a disfavored group;4"
by requiring disclosure of a group's membership lists or of an individual's
associational ties in situations where anonymity is important; 44 or by inter-
fering, either directly or indirectly, with the internal organization or integral
activities of the group.45
Cousins v. Wigoda4 6 presents a situation in which a state attempted to
interfere with the internal structure and organization of the National Demo-
cratic Party. The issue addressed by the Court was whether the national
party rules or the state election law regarding selection of members to the
national convention would prevail.4 7 Pursuant to Illinois election law, Chi-
cago's Democratic voters elected the "Wigoda delegates" as delegates to the
40. Id. at 464.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 466.
43. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 925 (1982) ("To impose
liability for presence at weekly meetings of the NAACP would-ironically-not even consti-
tute 'guilt by association,' since there is no evidence that the association possessed unlawful
aims. Rather, liability could only be imposed on a 'guilt for association' theory. Neither is
permissible under the First Amendment."); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 175 (1972) (college
president denied campus recognition to a student group wishing to form a local chapter of
Students for a Democratic Society because "the organization's philosophy was antithetical to
the school's policies").
44. See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 89 (1982)
(state campaign law requiring every candidate for political office to report the names and ad-
dresses of campaign contributors and recipients of campaign disbursements); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 480 (1960) (state statute requiring every teacher as a condition of em-
ployment to disclose every organization of which he was a member).
45. See the discussion of Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975), infra notes 46-57 and
accompanying text.
46. 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
47. A similar issue was addressed in Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette,
450 U.S. 107 (1981). The Democratic Party's Delegate Selection Rules provided that only
those individuals who were willing to affiliate publicly with the Democratic Party could par-
ticipate in selecting delegates to the party's national convention. Id. at 109. In Wisconsin,
delegates to the national convention were selected in private caucuses rather than by vote.
Moreover, a state statute required these delegates to vote at the convention in accordance with
the results of the state's "open" Democratic primary in which any voter could participate
without regard to party affiliation. Id. at 111-12.
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Democratic Convention.4" Meanwhile, the opposing "Cousins delegates"
challenged the seating of the Wigoda delegates before the Credentials Com-
mittee of the party.49 The committee found the Wigoda delegates were
seated in violation of party guidelines and recommended the Cousins dele-
gates be seated in their places.50 In protest, the Wigoda delegates obtained
an injunction in a state court enjoining the Cousins delegates from acting as
delegates to the convention.5"
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, acknowledged the National
Democratic Party and its members had a constitutional right of political
association: "[F]reedom to associate with others for the common advance-
ment of political beliefs and ideas is a form of 'orderly group activity' pro-
tected by the First and Fourteenth amendments.", 52 In evaluating whether
the injunction impermissibly interfered with the protected right of political
association, Justice Brennan applied the strict scrutiny test articulated in
NAACP v. Alabama, requiring a compelling state interest to justify state in-
terference with constitutionally protected activity.
53
In Wigoda, the state court had justified the injunction on the grounds that
the state had an interest in protecting both the integrity of its electoral pro-
cess and the right of its citizens to participate in primaries. 54 The Supreme
Court, however, held this interest was not compelling in the context of se-
lecting delegates to the national party convention.55 The Court explained
the purpose of the convention was to nominate party candidates for the of-
fices of president and vice-president and the states themselves had no consti-
tutionally-required role in this process. 56 Therefore, the national interest in
selecting these candidates outweighed any interest of an individual state.5 7
NAACP v. Alabama and Cousins v. Wigoda demonstrate that, in the ab-
sence of an articulated compelling state interest, governmental action cur-
48. Cousins, 419 U.S. at 478-79.
49. Id. at 479.
50. Id. at 479-80.
51. Id. at 480.
52. Id. at 487 (quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973)). Accord Demo-
cratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. at 122 ("And the freedom to associate
for the 'common advancement of political beliefs,'. . . necessarily presupposes the freedom to
identify the people who constitute the association, and to limit the association to those people
only.").
53. 419 U.S. at 489.
54. Id. at 488.
55. Id. at 491. "Consideration of the special function of delegates to such a Convention
militates persuasively against the conclusion that the asserted interest constitutes a compelling
state interest." Id. at 489.
56. Id. at 489-90.
57. Id. at 490.
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tailing the right to associate for the advancement of beliefs and ideas violates
the first amendment. On occasion, however, the Supreme Court has found
particular governmental objectives constitutionally sufficient to justify the
challenged limitation on freedom of association' s suggesting the test applied
is not "strict in theory and fatal in fact."59
In Buckley v. Valeo,e° the Court considered a challenge to the contribu-
tion and expenditure limitations and disclosure provisions of the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended in 1974.61 In a lengthy per
curiam opinion, the Court found the Act's contribution and expenditure lim-
itations interfered with the protected freedoms of both expression and associ-
ation.62  The Court explained that restrictions on spending by both
individuals and groups during a campaign necessarily reduce the quantity
and diversity of political expression as well as the size of the audience
reached.63 According to the Court, political associational freedoms also
were impinged because the ability to contribute serves to associate an indi-
vidual with a candidate and enables "like-minded persons to pool their re-
58. See Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 104 S. Ct. 1883 (1984) (uphold-
ing certain provisions of the union's collective bargaining agreement that allowed use of non-
member employees' agency fees to finance the national union's conventions, social activities,
and monthly magazine as justified by the governmental interest in industrial peace and in
eliminating "free rider" employees); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 462 (1978)
(affirming sanctions imposed on an attorney for commercial solicitation of legal business as
justified by the state's "compelling' interest in preventing those aspects of solicitation that
involve fraud, undue influence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of 'vexatious
conduct' ").
59. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doc-
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972).
Professor Gunther terms the Court's treatment of suspect classifications under equal protec-
tion analysis as a method of review that is "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact" because (with
one exception) racial classifications have always been invalidated under this test. Id. at 8. In
the first amendment context, however, compelling state interest language does not invoke this
level of strict scrutiny and one commentator suggests that interest-balancing is more often the
approach used by the Court. See Comment, Equal Protection and Due Process: Contrasting
Methods of Review Under Fourteenth Amendment Doctrine, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529,
553 (1979).
60. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
61. Id. at 15. Specifically challenged were provisions (1) limiting contributions to candi-
dates for federal office by an individual or group to $1,000 and by a political committee to
$5,000 for any one candidate per election, with an overall annual ceiling of $25,000 for an
individual contributor; (2) limiting expenditures by individuals or groups "relative to a clearly
identified candidate" to $1,000 per candidate per election, and by a candidate from his per-
sonal or family funds to various specified amounts depending upon the federal office sought;
(3) requiring political committees to keep detailed records of contributions and expenditures
and to disclose this information to the Federal Election Commission. See id. at 7.
62. Id. at 21-22.
63. Id. at 19.
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sources in furtherance of common political goals."' ' Before assessing the
validity of the various provisions of the Act, the Court reiterated the test
enunciated in NAACP v. Alabama that governmental action impinging upon
the freedom of association will be subject to the closest scrutiny.6 5 The
Buckley Court also determined the right to associate was not absolute and
even a significant interference with the freedom of political association may
be upheld where the state demonstrates a "sufficiently important" interest
and the means employed are narrowly tailored to prevent unnecessary in-
fringement of associational rights.66 In Buckley, the government asserted
three objectives advanced by the Act: to prevent corruption and the appear-
ance of corruption, to limit the disproportionate influence of the affluent,
and to reduce escalating costs of political campaigns.67
The Court first held that, under a rigorous standard of review, Congress'
primary interest in preventing corruption was a constitutionally sufficient
rationale for the contribution provisions and, therefore, justified the limited
impact upon first amendment concerns.61 Moreover, the Court found con-
tribution limitations were focused narrowly on the problem presented by
large campaign contributors.6 9 In comparison, the Court reached a different
result when it applied this "rigorous standard of review" to the expenditure
provisions. Initially, the Court found an expenditure ceiling "precludes
most associations from effectively amplifying the voice of their adherents,
the original basis for the recognition of First Amendment protection of the
freedom of association. "7° The Court held the government's interest in
preventing corruption did not justify the expenditure ceilings because these
provisions placed direct and substantial restrictions on the quantity of polit-
ical expression by individual citizens, candidates, and associations.7 1 Fi-
64. Id. at 22.
65. Id. at 25.
66. Id. Use of the language "sufficiently important" rather than requiring the asserted
state objective to be "compelling" may signal that the Court is applying a less strict standard
of review. Cf Young & Herbert, Political Association Under the Burger Court: Fading Protec-
tion, 15 U.C.D. L. REV. 53, 53 (1981) (arguing that the Burger Court "has gradually retreated
from the traditional strict scrutiny" of the Warren Court "in favor of the less stringent rational
relation standard of review"). But see In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 n.9 (noting that char-
acterizations of state interest as "overriding," "compelling," or "important" are not signifi-
cantly different).
67. 424 U.S. at 25-26.
68. Id. at 26-29.
69. Id. at 28. The Court reasoned that the Act's contribution provisions aimed at the
"narrow aspect of political association where the actuality and potential for corruption have
been identified" while leaving individuals free to engage in political expression and association.
Id.
70. Id. at 22.
71. Id. at 39, 58-59.
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nally, as to the Act's requirements for contribution and expenditure
disclosure, the Court first observed the "strict scrutiny test" articulated in
NAACP v. Alabama was applicable because compelled disclosure had the
potential for serious interference with the exercise of first amendment
rights.7 2 Applying this principle, the Court concluded that the asserted gov-
ernmental interests-informing voters of the source of candidates' funds, de-
terring corruption, and collecting data necessary to uncover violations-
were sufficiently important to outweigh the possibility of infringement.7 3 In
the Court's view, the disclosure requirements appeared to be the least re-
strictive means of furthering substantial congressional objectives. 4
In freedom of association cases following NAACP v. Alabama, the Court
consistently has described the right as inextricably bound to the freedoms of
speech and expression guaranteed by the first amendment and has required
that the challenged state action restrict the group members' ability to express
themselves. 7' Association as a vehicle for expressive purposes is highly val-
ued because "by collective effort individuals can make their views known,
when, as individually, their voices would be faint or lost."' 7 6 Moreover,
group expression is deemed essential in a democratic society to preserve
political and cultural diversity and to protect unpopular views from
majoritarian control.77 As construed by the Court, the Constitution protects
an associational right only where the association's goal or purpose is one
72. Id. at 66.
73. Id. at 66-68, 72.
74. Id. at 68. But see Young & Herbert, supra note 65, at 83:
Though purporting to undertake the traditional strict scrutiny analysis, the Court
did not meaningfully address whether the government could achieve its asserted
objectives through less expansive disclosure requirements. One must, therefore, at
least question whether the strict scrutiny test of the Burger Court in Buckley is the
same strict scrutiny test which the Warren Court employed nearly two decades ear-
lier in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.
Id.
75. See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 98 (1982)
(enforcement of disclosure provisions of state campaign law "could cripple a minor party's
ability to operate effectively and thereby reduce 'the free circulation of ideas both within and
without the political arena' "); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 911-14 (boy-
cott of white merchants by NAACP to effect political, social, and economic change involved
constitutionally protected activity and state court's issuance of an injunction directly impinged
on the NAACP's freedom of expression); Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair
Housing v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. at 299 (local ordinance imposing a contribution limit
operated as "a direct restraint on freedom of expression of a group or committee desiring to
engage in political dialogue").
76. Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 294.
77. See Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1979) ("The freedom to asso-
ciate applies to the beliefs we share, and to those we consider reprehensible. It tends to pro-
duce the diversity of opinion that oils the machinery of democratic government and insures
peaceful, orderly change.").
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that the first amendment independently protects such as political advo-
cacy,7" litigation to advance social goals,79 or religious worship. 0 Conse-
quently, the Supreme Court has not identified the freedom of association to
be an independent right;" there is no constitutionally guaranteed right to
associate freely with others for all purposes.
B. Freedom From Association
Paradoxically, the constitutional right to associate necessarily suggests a
parallel right to be free from association. The freedom from association con-
sists of two parts. The first is a presumed right to refrain from associations
not of one's choosing and focuses on the interest of the nonmember in inde-
pendence from coerced association. 2 The second part is an implied right of
the existing members of an association to exclude individuals with whom
they do not wish to associate."3 In the latter aspect, the emphasis is on the
tension between the interest of members in maintaining exclusive member-
ship and the interest of nonmembers in gaining access.
In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,4 the Supreme Court confronted a
claim of coerced association in the context of a public employees' union.
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, evaluated a freedom of association
challenge to an "agency shop" arrangement contained in a collective bar-
gaining agreement.8 5 The agreement required every teacher, as a condition
78. See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982); Buck-
ley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975); Healy v. James, 408
U.S. 169 (1972).
79. See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
80. See, e.g., Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
81. See Raggi, An Independent Right to Freedom of Association, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1 (1977). The author concludes that the Court's conception of the right of association is
narrow: "[W]henever men may speak as individuals, they may speak in and through groups
...." Id. at 10. She advocates the development of an "independent, nonexpressional formu-
lation of freedom of association" for the reason that:
[M]ost associations are not formed solely to express ideas or to petition the govern-
ment, but to take action to implement those ideas. The basic value of this associa-
tional action is that it allows an individual to achieve through collective effort what
he might not otherwise be able to achieve for himself.
Id. at 11.
82. Two commentators suggest that the Burger Court may treat claims of coerced associa-
tion as less deserving of constitutional protection than claims of freedom to associate. Young
& Herbert, supra note 65, at 87.
83. In other words, members may discriminate on the basis of any criteria they choose.
84. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
85. Id. at 213. An "agency shop" agreement requires employees to pay periodic dues and
fees to the union but does not require the employees to actually join the union as in a "union
shop" agreement. T. HAGGARD, COMPULSORY UNIONISM, THE NLRB AND THE COURTS 38
(1977); cf. R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 642
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of employment by the city, either to become a member of the union or to pay
the union a service charge equal to membership dues.8 6 A group of teachers
filed a class action against the union alleging, in part, that requiring ob-
jecting employees to contribute to ideological activities, unrelated to collec-
tive bargaining, violated their freedom of association.8 7 Initially, the Court
noted that financing the union could be construed as an interference with an
employee's "freedom to associate for the advancement of ideas, or to refrain
from doing so, as he sees fit.",8 8 Nevertheless, the Court found that to the
extent the service charges were used to finance expenditures by the union for
"collective bargaining, contract administration and grievance adjustment"
purposes, the agency shop clause was valid.8 9 The Court perceived any in-
terference with nonmember employees' freedom of association was justified
by the state's interests in deterring free-riders by allocating the costs of col-
lective bargaining among all who benefit and in promoting labor peace
through avoidance of multiple negotiations with rival unions. 90
In Abood, the Court declined to hold that it would be unconstitutional for
public employee unions to expend funds for the expression of political or
ideological causes not pertinent to their duties as collective bargaining
agent. 91 Instead, the majority held the union could not require any teacher,
as a condition of employment, to contribute to the support of any ideological
cause he or she opposed.92 The Court explained compulsory contribution
for political or other ideological purposes infringed upon the constitutional
rights of dissenting employees in the same way that prohibiting contribu-
tions abridged the rights of advocates. 93 Further, the Court concluded that
(1976) ("The agency shop requires that an employee ... simply pay the union for services
rendered by the union to employees within the bargaining unit as the employees' 'agent' in
negotiating and administering the labor contract.").
86. 431 U.S. at 212.
87. Id. at 212-13. The plaintiffs also argued that collective bargaining in the public sector
was fundamentally political and as such, coerced contributions violated the first and fourteenth
amendments. Id. at 227.
88. Id. at 222.
89. Id. at 225-26. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied upon its prior ruling in
Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956) (upholding the constitutionality
under the first amendment of a "union shop" agreement requiring every member of the bar-
gaining unit to contribute financially to the exclusive bargaining representative).
90. Abood, 431 U.S. at 221-22.
91. Id. at 235.
92. Id. A similar holding was reached in International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367
U.S. 740 (1961), where the Court confronted a challenge to the constitutionality of a "union
shop" agreement authorized by the Railway Labor Act. The Court, however, did not reach
the first amendment issue because it held that the Act itself prohibited the unions, over an
employee's objection, from using his dues to support political causes that he opposed. Id. at
768-69.
93. 431 U.S. at 234.
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expenditures for noncollective bargaining activity must be financed from
dues paid by employees who neither object to supporting those causes nor
are forced into doing so by fear of losing their government jobs.94
The second aspect of freedom from association implicates a potential right
of the members of a private organization to choose with whom they will not
associate. Two principal cases raise a question about the extent to which the
Supreme Court recognizes a private right to discriminate on the basis of
race.
In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis," the Court addressed whether a private
club with a racially discriminatory guest policy violated the fourteenth
amendment.96 The plaintiff, a black guest of a white member of Moose
Lodge, was refused service at the club's dining room and bar solely because
of his race. 97 Although conceding the right of private clubs to choose mem-
bers on a discriminatory basis, the plaintiff asserted that the licensing of
Moose Lodge to serve liquor by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board
amounted to state action.9" The relief sought was an injunction requiring
the liquor board to revoke the lodge's license until it ceased its discrimina-
tory practices.99
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, held that the grant of a state
liquor license to Moose Lodge did not constitute sufficient state action to
invoke the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment."° At the
94. Id. at 235-36.
95. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
96. Id. at 164-65. The Court determined initially that the plaintiff had no standing to
litigate the club's membership policy because he had not applied for and been denied admis-
sion. Id. at 166-67.
97. Id. at 165.
98. Id. at 171.
99. Id. at 165.
100. Id. at 177. The fourteenth amendment applies only to conduct by the state and to
private conduct that is significantly involved with state action. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 10-11 (1883) (nullifying Congress' attempt through the Civil Rights Act of 1875 to
prohibit private discrimination in public accommodations).
The Supreme Court has not considered any cases in which women, excluded from private
clubs, have urged that a sufficient link between the club and the state exists to constitute state
action. Decisions by lower federal courts, however, addressing the issue do not hold out much
promise for future challenges on equal protection grounds. See, e.g., United States Jaycees v.
Philadelphia Jaycees, 639 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1981); New York City Jaycees v. United States
Jaycees, 512 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1975); Junior Chamber of Commerce v. Missouri State Junior
Chamber of Commerce, 508 F.2d 1031 (8th Cir. 1975); Junior Chamber of Commerce v.
United States Jaycees, 495 F.2d 883 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974); Millenson
v. New Hotel Monteleone, Inc., 475 F.2d 736 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1011 (1973). In
each case the Court found that the requisite state action was absent.
In addition to the general problem of finding state action, it has been suggested that lower
federal courts require a more substantial showing of state action in cases of alleged gender-
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outset, the Court stated that Moose Lodge was a private club as the term
was commonly understood. °0 The Court explained that the Lodge was pri-
vate because it was a local chapter of a national organization whose bylaws
provided well-defined criteria for membership, the building where all lodge
activities were conducted was privately owned, the club received no public
funds, and only members and their invited guests were permitted inside the
lodge. 10 2 The Court also noted that the club did not hold itself out as a place
of public accommodation, but maintained that it was not open to the general
public.13 Moreover, the Pennsylvania courts had found that the local
based discrimination than in cases involving alleged racial discrimination. See Burns, supra
note 29, at 370-7 1; Calhoun, The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments: Constitutional Au-
thority for Federal Legislation Against Private Sex Discrimination, 61 MINN. L. REV. 313, 338-
48 (1977); Goodwin, Challenging the Private Club: Sex Discrimination Plaintiffs Barred at the
Door, 13 Sw. U.L. REV. 237, 243-44 (1982). The rationale advanced for this double standard
seems to be that historically race has been considered a suspect criterion and classifications
based on race invoke the most rigorous review while gender is not a suspect criterion and
classifications based on gender receive only heightened scrutiny. Id. See generally Jakosa,
Parsing Public From Private: The Failure of Differential State Action Analysis, 19 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 193, 194 (1984) (asserting that his purpose is not to offer an additional critique of
the "conceptual disaster area" of conventional state action analysis but to examine an alterna-
tive approach formulated by lower federal courts).
101. Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 171.
102. Id. Cf Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 438-39 (1973)
(community swimming pool was not a private club within the meaning of § 2000a(e) of the
1964 Civil Rights Act because membership was open to all whites within the geographic area,
with no selective criteria used other than race); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S.
229, 236 (1969) (corporation that operated playground facility and community park was not a
private club because there was "no plan or purpose of exclusiveness").
103. Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 175. Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits discrim-
ination or segregation in places of public accommodation and declares that: "All persons shall
be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advan-
tages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation. . . without discrimination
or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a)
(1982). Lower federal courts in cases involving challenges of racial discrimination based on
title II have outlined a number of factors relevant in assessing a club's contention that it is
"private." The list of variables includes: selectiveness of the group in choosing new members;
existence of well-defined criteria for membership; presence of formal membership procedures;
size of the group; members' role in selection or rejection of new members; amount of dues;
openness of guest policies; public advertisement; and presence of business or commercial char-
acteristics. Generally, the courts will employ a totality of the circumstances test by evaluating
the presence or absence of the above factors to determine whether the club qualifies for exemp-
tion under § 2000a(e) of the Act. See, e.g., Smith v. YMCA, 462 F.2d 634, 648 (5th Cir.
1972); United States v. Richberg, 398 F.2d 523, 526-29 (5th Cir. 1968); Nesmith v. YMCA,
397 F.2d 96, 101-02 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Trustee of the Fraternal Order of Eagles,
472 F. Supp. 1174, 1175-76 (E.D. Wis. 1979); Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of
Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182, 1203-04 (D. Conn. 1974); Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143,
1151-53 (S.D. Tex. 1970); United States v. Johnson Lake, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 1376, 1378-81
(S.D. Ala. 1970); Bell v. Kenwood Golf & Country Club, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 753, 755-56 (D.
Md. 1970); United States v. YMCA, 310 F. Supp. 79, 80-81 (D.S.C. 1970); United States v.
1985] 1069
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 34:1055
Moose Lodge was not a place of public accommodation within the meaning
of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act." 4 In concluding that Moose
Lodge could continue its discriminatory guest policy, the Court reaffirmed
the dichotomy between discriminatory action by the state, which is prohib-
ited by the fourteenth amendment, and private discrimination, which the
Jordan, 302 F. Supp. 370, 375-77 (E.D. La. 1969); United States v. Jack Sabin's Private Club,
265 F. Supp. 90, 92-93 (E.D. La. 1967); Williams v. Rescue Fire Co., 254 F. Supp. 556, 560-63
(D. Md. 1966).
104. Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 175 n.2. See Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v.
Loyal Order of Moose, 220 Pa. Super. 356, 286 A.2d 374 (1971).
State legislatures are free to enact their own public accommodations laws and to expand the
concept of "public" as used in title II and to extend coverage to other groups. At present, 40
states and the District of Columbia have enacted such statutes and 36 of these proscribe dis-
crimination on the basis of gender. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.230 (1981); CAL. CIV. CODE § 51
(West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601 (1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64 (West
1984); D.C. CODE ANN. 1-2519 (1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4502 (1975); IDAHO CODE
§ 18-7301 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 5-102 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); IND. CODE
ANN. § 22-9-1-2 (Burns Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.7 (West 1975); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 44-1001 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. § 344.145 (Supp. 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 49:146 (West Supp. 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4552 (1979); MD. ANN. CODE art.
49B, § 5 (Supp. 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 98 (West Supp. 1984-1985); MICH.
COMp. LAWS ANN. § 37.2302 (West Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(3) (West
1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 314.010 (Vernon Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-304
(1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-132 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8 (1984); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(0 (West Supp. 1984-1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (1983); N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 291 (McKinney 1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-14-04 (1976); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (Page 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.670 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 953 (Purdon Supp. 1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-1 (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 20-13-23.(1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-111 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-7-3 (Supp.
1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.030 (West Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-2 (Supp.
1984); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 942.04 (West 1982 & Supp. 1984-1985); Wyo. STAT. § 6-9-101
(1983).
The statutes of 25 states and the District of Columbia explicitly provide an exemption for
private organizations and no statute specifically prohibits discrimination by private clubs.
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1441(2) (1974 & Supp. 1975-1984); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-
2502(24) (1981); IDAHO CODE § 18-7302(e) (1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 5-103 (Smith-
Hurd 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.2(10) (West Supp. 1984-1985); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 44-1002(h) (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. § 344.130 (1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:146A(2)
(West Supp. 1985); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 5 (Supp. 1984); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN.
§ 37.2303 (West Supp. 1967-1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 314.040 (Vernon Supp. 1985); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 20.138 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 651.060 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(o
(West Supp. 1984-1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-2(G) (1983); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(9)
(McKinney 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1401(l)(i) (West Supp. 1984-1985); OR. REV.
STAT. § 30.675(2) (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954 (1) (Purdon 1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 11-24-3 (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-13-1(12) (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-
21-102(13) (Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-7-2(a) (Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 49.60.040 (West Supp. 1985); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-30) (Supp. 1984); WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 942.04(2) (West 1982). Federal law does not mandate this result; title II establishes a
threshold level of protection and the states are free to enlarge, but not diminish the scope of
equal access rights guaranteed by federal law.
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equal protection clause does not reach.105
Although the Court upheld a private right to discriminate in Moose
Lodge, it invalidated, in Runyon v. McCrary,10 6 a private school's practice of
denying admission on the basis of race.1o7 In Runyon, black school children,
in a suit brought by their parents, alleged they were refused admission to all-
white private schools solely because of their race in violation of section 1981
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.108 In defense, the schools contended that
application of section 1981 violated the first amendment right of association
possessed by the white parents of children enrolled in the schools.,0 9
The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Stewart, specifically stated
that whether a private social organization had a right to exclude individuals
from membership on racial or other grounds was not at issue." 0 Instead,
the Court asked whether section 1981 prohibited private commercially-oper-
ated schools from denying admission to qualified black applicants on the
basis of their race."' First, the Court acknowledged that section 198 I's pro-
hibition against racial discrimination in the making and enforcing of con-
tracts applied to private acts of discrimination." 2 Justice Stewart held that
the racial discrimination practiced by the schools constituted a clear viola-
tion of section 1981: the children's parents sought to enter into a contractual
relationship with the schools but discovered that the schools did not offer
105. Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 172.
106. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
107. Id. at 178-79. It is important to note that the plaintiff in Moose Lodge brought suit
under the equal protection clause, which requires a demonstration of state action, while the
plaintiffs in Runyon based their claim on § 1981 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, which does not
require state action. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). Although § 1982
and not § 1981 was at issue in Jones, the decision effectively made both sections applicable to
private acts of discrimination. See id. at 422 n.28, 441 n.78.
108. 427 U.S. at 163-64. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982 & Supp. 1983) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens ....
Id.
109. 427 U.S. at 175. The schools also defended their admissions policies on the basis of
the parents' right to privacy and right to educate their children. The Court found neither
argument persuasive. Id. at 176-78.
110. Id. at 167.
111. Id. at 163.
112. Id. at 175. Commentators have noted, however, that lower federal courts, with very
few exceptions, have refused to extend 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to reach private gender discrimination
in the contract setting. These courts have apparently construed the language of § 1981 as an
expression of Congress' intent to limit the prohibition to discrimination of a racial nature.
Calhoun, supra note 100, at 319. Accord Goodwin, supra note 100, at 241 (there is no federal
statute that proscribes gender-based discrimination in private contracts or property
transactions).
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educational services on an equal basis to white and nonwhite students."1 '
The Court next considered whether section 1981 as applied violated the
parents' constitutionally protected right of association. 1 4 Before assessing
the constitutional challenge, the Court reaffirmed the principle stated in
NAACP v. Alabama that the first amendment protects association for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas because it promotes "effective advocacy of
both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones."" ' 5
From this principle, the Court extrapolated that parents have a right under
the first amendment to send their children to schools that foster the belief
that segregation is desirable and that their children have a commensurate
right to attend such schools." 6 The Court suggested, however, that the
right of association for expressive purposes does not protect the practice of
denying admission to racial minorities.' Thus, there was no violation of
the parents' freedom of association as they remained free to advocate segre-
gation." 8 Moreover, the Court added there was no evidence that cessation
of the school's discriminatory admissions policy would curtail in any way its
expression of discriminatory ideas." 9
Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, emphasized that the Court's opin-
ion should not be construed to imply that every refusal to contract is subject
to the sanctions of section 1981.120 He distinguished between personal con-
113. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 172-73.
114. Id. at 175-76.
115. Id. at 175 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)).
116. Id. at 176.
117. Id. Justice Stewart reasoned that " 'the Constitution ... places no value on discrimi-
nation,' and while '[i]nvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exer-
cising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment . . . it has never been
accorded affirmative constitutional protections.'" Id. (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S.
455, 469-70 (1973)).
118. One commentator suggests that because the Runyon Court perceived association only
in terms of speech and expression, it avoided the more basic associational claim: the white
parents' asserted right not to associate with blacks in the educational setting. Raggi, supra
note 81, at 25. The author proposes an alternative approach:
[R]ather than twisting the associational goal of the parents in the case in order to
show that "freedom of association" was not being impinged, the Court ... could
have stated candidly that the mere presence of an associational interest in a case does
not grant immunity from liability for violations of the law committed in pursuit of that
interest.
Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
119. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176.
120. Id. at 187 (Powell, J., concurring). See generally Note, supra note 2. The author
analyzes the conflict between freedom of association, which implies a right to discriminate, and
freedom from racial discrimination guaranteed by the principles of equality derived from the
thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. Id. The note encourages courts applying § 1981 in
the context of private clubs to develop an approach that provides "meaningful freedom for
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tractual relationships and commercial relationships. The former, he ex-
plained, were private in the sense that the choice to contract made by the
offeror reflected a plan or purpose of exclusiveness or selectivity other than
an interest in excluding black persons from the relationship.'21 These rela-
tionships, Powell asserted, would implicate the right of association 122 and
should not be restricted by section 1981.123 Commercial relationships, in
contrast, are those openly offered to the general public with the decision to
contract based on no selective qualifications other than race. 124 Justice Pow-
ell found this type of relationship to be more public than private and clearly
within the purview of section 1981.125
The Court's opinions in Moose Lodge and Runyon suggest that in the nar-
row context of private clubs and schools some degree of private racial dis-
crimination, implied by the right of association, is not specifically prohibited
by the Constitution. The Court, however, had not considered the closer case
involving whether the freedom of expressive association could be invoked to
protect the policy of a 295,000-member national organization excluding wo-
men from membership.
II. ROBERTS V. UNITED STATES JAYCEE" OPENING THE DOOR TO
CHALLENGES AGAINST QUASI-PRIVATE CLUBS
A. A Fine Line Between Free Speech and Free Association
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,'2 6 the Supreme Court evaluated the
interest of the State of Minnesota in securing equal access to publicly avail-
able goods and services for its female citizens and the Jaycees' interest in
freedom of association. The Court concluded for the first time that the
state's "compelling interest" in eliminating gender discrimination justified
any effect that requiring the Jaycees to admit women might have on the male
members' freedom of association.' 27 The ruling is significant because it af-
firms the broad power of the state to prohibit gender discrimination even at
the expense of invaluable first amendment rights. The Court's analysis,
private groups to choose social intimates without granting a blanket and absolute right to
practice racial discrimination." Id. at 1476.
121. 427 U.S. at 187-88. Examples of personal contractual relationships, Powell suggested,
would be those between an employer and a private tutor, babysitter, or housekeeper. Id. at
187.
122. Id. at 188.
123. Id. at 189.
124. Id. at 188-89. See Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973);
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
125. 427 U.S. at 188-89.
126. 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984).
127. Id. at 3253.
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however, will generate confusion about the extent to which the freedom of
association can still be used by single-sex organizations as a shield for dis-
criminatory membership policies.
Justice Brennan began his analysis for the Court with a discussion of the
two aspects of freedom of association he labeled freedom of "intimate associ-
ation" and freedom of "expressive association. '  The Court emphasized
the narrow scope of freedom of intimate association as it relates to certain
"personal affiliations" such as marriage, procreation, child rearing, and fam-
ily living arrangements12 9 and concluded that because the Jaycees are a
large, unselective group whose activities involve the participation of outsid-
ers to the association, they lack the necessary attributes of familial relation-
ships and cannot claim protection under the right of intimate association. 3 o
Turning to the freedom of expressive association, the Court first observed
that it had long recognized the right to associate with others in order to
engage in activities independently protected by the first amendment-
speech, assembly, petition for redress of grievances, and religion.' 3' Given
the existence of such a right, the Court outlined the general ways that gov-
ernment may seek to interfere with its enjoyment. 132 Justice Brennan deter-
mined that application of Minnesota's Human Rights Act to the Jaycees to
compel them to accept unwelcome members was the clearest example of the
state's interference with the internal organizational affairs of the group.'
33
Next, the Court stated, without elucidation, the axiomatic principle that
freedom of association necessarily implies a right not to associate.' 34 Having
determined the Jaycees' freedom of association had been infringed, the Court
reaffirmed the principle that the right to associate for expressive purposes is
not absolute and stated the test to be applied: "infringements on that right
may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests,
128. Id. at 3249-50. This is the first time that the Court has used this terminology and the
bifurcated approach in freedom of association analysis. The Jaycees did not challenge applica-
tion of the statute on the grounds that it violated the members' right to privacy or "intimate
association." See United States Jaycees v. McClure, 534 F. Supp. at 770. Allegedly "private"
organizations when confronted with a claim of discrimination generally raise two defenses-
freedom of association and the right to privacy. See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 175. Justice
Brennan, therefore, may have felt compelled to examine both issues.
129. 104 S. Ct. at 3250-51.
130. Id. at 3251. Justice O'Connor agreed with the Court's conclusion stating: "Whatever
the precise scope of the rights recognized in [the Court's privacy] cases, they do not encompass
associational rights of a 295,000-member organization whose activities are not 'private' in any
meaningful sense of that term." Id. at 3257 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
131. Id. at 3251.
132. Id. at 3252. See generally supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
133. Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. at 3252.
134. Id. (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977)).
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unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means
significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms."' 135
In applying this three-part test, the Court first asserted the Minnesota Act
on its face was content and viewpoint neutral and was not susceptible to
abuse by enforcement officials. 136 Second, Justice Brennan concluded Min-
nesota's goal of "eliminating discrimination and assuring its citizens equal
access to publicly available goods and services. . . plainly serves compelling
state interests of the highest order."' 37 By prohibiting discrimination in
places of public accommodation, he reasoned the Act protected the state's
citizens from the twin evils of deprivation of personal dignity 13' and denial
of equal opportunity, which were suffered by victims of both gender-based
and racial discrimination. 39 Third, the Court turned to the least restrictive
means part of the test and concluded, at the outset, that in compelling the
Jaycees to accept women the state had effectuated its interests through
means that did not unnecessarily restrict the Jaycees' freedom of expressive
association. "'
On the one hand, the Court acknowledged that many of the activities en-
gaged in by the Jaycees were deserving of constitutional protection under the
first amendment. 4 ' On the other hand, the Court perceived no basis in the
record to warrant a conclusion that admission of women as full voting mem-
bers would impair the group's ability to continue these activities or to circu-
late its preferred views.' 42 Moreover, the Court pointed out that the
Jaycees, while denying women the privilege of voting, already allowed wo-
men to participate in many of the organization's other expressive activi-
ties. 1 3 Justice Brennan unequivocally rejected the view of the Jaycees,
supported by the Eighth Circuit, that allowing women to vote would change
the content or impact of the group's speech because women hold different
135. Id.
136. Id. at 3253.
137. Id. See United States Jaycees v. McClure, 534 F. Supp. 766, 771 (D. Minn. 1982).
138. Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. at 3253.
139. Id. at 3254.
140. Id.
141. Id. This was the conclusion reached by the Eighth Circuit in United States Jaycees v.
McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1570 (8th Cir. 1983) ("[A] good deal of what the [Jaycees] does
indisputably comes within the right of association, even as limited to association in pursuance
of the specific ends of speech, writing, belief, and assembly for redress of grievances.").
142. "The Act requires no change in the Jaycees' creed of promoting the interests of young
men, and it imposes no restrictions on the organization's ability to exclude individuals with
ideologies or philosophies different from those of its existing members." Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. at
3254.
143. Id. at 3254-55.
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views on issues of concern to the Jaycees. " The Court found this position
untenable because the Jaycees, in advancing the argument, had relied exclu-
sively on unsupported generalizations about the gender-based interests and
perspectives of men and women. 145  Justice Brennan underscored the
Court's position by asserting that to meet their burden, the Jaycees would
have to demonstrate by a substantial showing that admission of women as
full voting numbers would "change the content or impact" of the group's
speech. 146 Finally, the Court concluded that even if compelling the Jaycees
to admit women resulted in some incidental abridgement of the Jaycees' ex-
pression, that effect was no more than necessary to effectuate the state's le-
gitimate interests. 
47
In the last section of the opinion, the Court confronted the Jaycees' chal-
lenge that the Act, as construed by the Minnesota Supreme Court, was un-
constitutionally vague and overbroad.' 4 s The Court rejected the Jaycees'
challenge for two reasons. First, Justice Brennan acknowledged that the
state court employed a number of specific and objective criteria-size, selec-
tivity of members, commercial characteristics, and use of public facilities-
to determine whether the Jaycees was a place of public accommodation as
contemplated by the Act.'4 9 Second, the Court found the Minnesota court's
144. Id. at 3255. Contra United States Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d at 1571:
If the statute is upheld, the basic purpose of the Jaycees will change. It will become
an association for the advancement of young people. . . . [S]ome change in the
Jaycees' philosophical cast can reasonably be expected. . . . [I]t will not be long
before efforts are made to change the Jaycee Creed. Young women may take a dim
view of affirming the 'brotherhood of man,' or declaring how 'free men' can best win
economic justice.
Id.
145. Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. at 3255.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 3256. Justice O'Connor joined this portion of the Court's opinion. See id. at
3257.
149. Id. at 3256. See United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981).
The Minnesota Supreme Court found that the state legislature expressly required by statute
that all the provisions of the Act be broadly construed to accomplish the purpose of securing
for its citizens freedom from discrimination. Id. at 766. Furthermore, in tracing the legislative
history of the Act, the state court found that the legislature had continually broadened the
term "place of public accommodation" to mean "a business . . . facility of any kind . . .
whose goods . . . [and] privileges are . . . offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the
public." Id. at 768 (emphasis in original) (quoting MINN. STAT. § 363.01(18) (1967)). Apply-
ing this definition to the Jaycees the court concluded that the Act reached the organization
because it was:
a business in that it sells goods and extends privileges in exchange for annual mem-
bership dues[,]. . . a public business in that it solicits and recruits dues paying mem-
bers but is unselective in admitting them[,] and. . . a public business facility in that
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reference to the Kiwanis club as a private organization 5 ° helped to clarify
rather than obscure the standards used to determine whether the organiza-
tion was public or private151 because the Kiwanis organization, unlike the
Jaycees, had a formal procedure for selecting members that employed spe-
cific, identifiable criteria. 1
52
Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence, agreed with the Court that applica-
tion of the Act to the Jaycees did not violate the first amendment, but she
criticized the Court's analysis of the right of expressive association. 153 In
particular, she interpreted the Court's language as imposing a requirement
that an organization raising the defense of freedom of association demon-
strate by a substantial showing that admitting women as full voting members
will actually change the content or message of the group's speech.' 54 Ini-
tially, she objected that the Court did not provide any guidance regarding
the nature of the showing that would be required to satisfy the Court.' 55
More specifically, she expressed concern that imposing this requirement in
conjunction with what she perceived to be the Court's use of a "balancing-
of-interests test" might shield the discriminatory practices of "commercial
associations" undeserving of constitutional protection and, at the same time,
provide inadequate protection for expressive associations. 56 She suggested
that use of this approach inappropriately would focus the inquiry on the
content of the organization's speech. 157 Constitutional protection for associ-
ation, in her view, should not be dependent on "what the association says or
why its members say it." '58 Moreover, Justice O'Connor contended the
Court failed to establish at the outset that the Jaycees was an association
it continuously recruits and sells memberships at sites within the State of Min-
nesota ....
Id. (emphasis in original).
150. Id. at 771 (rejecting the Jaycees' "suggestion that it be viewed analogously to private
organizations such as the Kiwanis").
151. Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. at 3256.
152. Id. at 3256. See United States Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1582 (8th Cir.
1983) (Lay, C.J., dissenting):
The membership of the Kiwanis group is limited so that the number of members in
any one given occupational classification cannot exceed 20% of the total active mem-
bership. Such a restriction circumscribes membership boundaries and would serve in
itself to make the Kiwanis "private," unlike the Jaycees which has no limiting re-
quirements except for age and sex.
Id.




157. Id. at 3258.
158. Id.
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worthy of first amendment protection. 159
Justice O'Connor articulated an alternative approach that involved char-
acterizing the association as either predominantly "commercial" or
predominantly "expressive." ' 16° The rationale behind this dichotomy, she
explained, was that an association engaged exclusively in expressive activity
deserved protection for both the content of its speech and the selection of its
members, while an association engaged primarily in commercial transactions
received only minimal constitutional protection.1 6 ' Thus, expressive as-
sociations were essentially free from state interference while commercial as-
sociations were subject to any rational state regulation.
62
From the start, she recognized that making this determination often
would be difficult because, although many activities are expressive, not all of
them are forms of protected expression. 163 She suggested relevant consider-
ations would include the objectives of an association and the reasons why its
members joined it.1 " Under her analysis, the threshold question was
whether the organization was predominantly expressive or predominantly
commercial. If the answer was the latter, then there was no need, in her
view, to apply any other test because of the absence of any significant inter-
ference with protected first amendment rights. Justice O'Connor assessed
the Jaycees as a straightforward case for application of her framework. 65
Although she acknowledged the Jaycees engaged in some protected expres-
sive activity, she emphasized their organization was primarily involved in
the commercial activities of recruitment, training, and selling. 166 Therefore,
the amount of protected Jaycees' activities was insufficient to offset the es-
sentially commercial nature of the group, and application of the Act to com-




160. Id. at 3259.
161. Id. Justice O'Connor reasoned: "It is only when the association is predominantly
engaged in protected expression that state regulation of its membership will necessarily affect,
change, dilute or silence one collective voice that would otherwise be heard." Id.
162. As Justice O'Connor explained, as soon as an association "enters the marketplace of
commerce" in any significant way, it relinquishes the exclusive control over membership selec-
tion that it previously enjoyed. Id.
163. Id. For example, Justice O'Connor provided that lawyering to further social goals
was probably speech while day-to-day commercial law practice was not. Similarly, a boycott
for political or social purposes was generally expression while a boycott in order to maintain a
cartel was not. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 3261.
166. Id.
167. "The members of the Jaycees may not claim constitutional immunity from Minne-
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B. The Jaycees Decision: Establishing Divergent Theories of Associational
Rights in Private Clubs
The Court's opinion in Jaycees affirms the Minnesota Supreme Court's
determination that the Jaycees was a place of public accommodation within
the meaning of the state's antidiscrimination law. Thus, the Court reinforces
the authority of state legislatures to decide the kinds of facilities covered and
the groups protected by their public accommodation statutes and empha-
sizes the responsibility of state courts to determine on a case-by-case basis
which organizations are within reach of their laws. Noticeably absent from
the Court's analysis, moreover, is any attempt to formulate "the test" to
determine whether an allegedly private club is, in reality, a place of public
accommodation. One practical effect of the Court's deference is that to the
extent assuring women equal access to publicly available benefits and privi-
leges is a desirable goal, the primary responsibility for its achievement rests
with the individual states and not with the Supreme Court.16
The Court's inquiry was focused not on the issue whether a truly private
club has a constitutional right to discriminate but on whether compelling the
Jaycees, as a place of public accommodation, to accept women violated its
members' protected right of association.169 The central thrust of Justice
Brennan's analysis was on the freedom of "expressive association," and use
of this language reaffirms the principle first enunciated in NAACP v. Ala-
bama that the Constitution protects association for the advancement of be-
liefs and ideas.17° Moreover, it emphasized the current Court's perception
that the constitutional right of association exists solely as a vehicle for free-
dom of expression and has not achieved an independent status.171
In his analysis, Justice Brennan applied a three-part test172 similar to the
strict standard of review previously articulated by the Supreme Court in as-
sociational cases but with an added dimension. In addition to requiring a
sota's antidiscrimination law by seeking to exercise their First Amendment rights through this
commercial organization." Id.
168. Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act does not include a prohibition against gender
discrimination in public accommodations. See supra note 102. Although Congress, pursuant
to its authority under the Commerce Clause, has the power to amend the Act, one commenta-
tor suggests that such legislative action is "unlikely in the present political climate." Bums,
supra note 29, at 376.
169. The Minnesota Supreme Court had previously decided the Jaycees was not a private
club within the meaning of the state statute. See United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305
N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981). The public/private issue was not before the United States Supreme
Court except to the extent that it related to Justice Brennan's evaluation of the Jaycees' vague-
ness and overbreadth challenges.
170. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
172. See supra text accompanying note 135.
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compelling state interest effectuated through means that are the least restric-
tive of associational freedoms, the Jaycees Court required the regulation to
be neutral in content and viewpoint and administered in an evenhanded
fashion. 17 3 Prior Supreme Court rulings involving freedom of association
did not impose this requirement, although it is analogous to the Court's
treatment of "time, place and manner" regulations in the area of freedom of
expression. 174 While this additional requirement does not materially change
the traditional strict scrutiny test, it reinforces the Jaycees Court's emphasis
on the speech element as the essence of the freedom of association.
In applying the compelling interest component of the test, Justice Brennan
announced for the first time that Minnesota's goal of eradicating discrimina-
tion against its female citizens was a compelling state interest. 1 75 The facts
and procedural background of Jaycees presented a case of first impression.
The Supreme Court never before considered a constitutional challenge to a
state public accommodation law prohibiting gender-based discrimination. 176
Moreover, in no other context had the Court taken the opportunity to evalu-
ate an articulated state interest in protecting women from public discrimina-
tion. Justice Brennan's use of the adjective "compelling" rather than
"important"1 77 in describing Minnesota's interest suggests the strong ideo-
logical commitment of the members of the Court to the state's goal.
Use of "compelling interest" language raises a question whether the pres-
ent Court believes that the interest in eliminating discrimination against wo-
men is always compelling or whether such a determination is dependent on
the context of the discrimination. For example, in the principal case, Justice
Brennan had no difficulty holding that the state's interest in providing equal
access to publicly available goods and services was compelling. If, however,
a state sought through legislation to eradicate gender discrimination in truly
private clubs would the Court again find such a goal compelling? Although
the Court's broad language could be construed as a per se rule, the more
conservative argument is that the state's interest would be evaluated on a
case-by-case basis according to the relevant circumstances.
The Court's previous rulings in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis and Runyon
v. McCrary suggest that a truly private organization with a highly selective
173. Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. at 3253.
174. See, e.g., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620,
636, 637 (1980) (the government may further its legitimate interests only through "narrowly
drawn regulations" designed to further "sufficiently strong, subordinating interest[s]" and
"without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms").
175. Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. at 3253.
176. See supra note 100.
177. See the discussion of Buckley supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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membership policy not open to the general public may have a private right
to discriminate and the right of association will prevail over the state's inter-
est. 7 8 Moreover, in Jaycees the Court emphasized the personal and social
harms suffered by women who are denied equality of opportunity with re-
gard to public goods and services. 7 9 Thus, in a private context, the Court
might be less inclined to hold that the harm, resulting from denied access to
benefits and privileges provided by truly private clubs, was substantial
enough to warrant abridgement of the members' freedom from
association. 180
In addressing the third component of the test, the Court concluded the
state had employed the least restrictive means available to effectuate its in-
terest.1 81 As Justice O'Connor suggested, the Court apparently required the
Jaycees to demonstrate by a substantial showing that allowing women to
become full voting members would change the content or message of the
group's speech.182 In imposing this requirement, the Court observed that
forcing the organization to accept unwanted members significantly inter-
fered with its freedom of association. There was, however, no first amend-
ment violation without the requisite showing that such action had a negative
impact on the male members' ability to express themselves. Although previ-
ous Supreme Court rulings required a similar showing,' 83 its imposition in
the context of gender discrimination poses difficult questions of quantifica-
tion. The Court's analysis in this regard is problematic.
In rejecting the Jaycees' claim that allowing women to vote would change
the group's speech, Justice Brennan did not suggest that this argument could
not be advanced but indicated instead that the Jaycees had failed to meet its
burden of proof by relying on unsubstantiated generalizations about the gen-
der-based interests and views of men and women. 184 Justice Brennan noted
such generalizations might have a statistical basis in fact. In light of the
present Court's articulated antipathy toward judicial decision making based
on sexual stereotypes, however, an all male organization like the Jaycees
should be cautioned against attempting to present such statistics. 185
178. See generally supra notes 95-125 and accompanying text.
179. 104 S. Ct. at 3253.
180. As the nature of the club becomes more private, it could be argued that on the basis of
a "right to privacy," the members' interest in exclusive association increases and the state's
interest in eradicating the harms of public discrimination becomes less persuasive.
181. Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. at 3254.
182. Id. at 3255.
183. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
184. Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. at 3255.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 144-46; see also Denniston, A Hard Sell at the
High Court, THE AMERICAN LAW., Sept. 1984, at 102 ("It would take a super salesman--one,
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Thus, the Court appeared to leave open the possibility that the right of
expressive association may prevail where an organization can demonstrate
men and women hold different views on issues of concern to the association,
and where such organization can prove that admission of women will impair
the members' ability to promote male views.186 Justice Brennan's opinion,
however, provided no practical guidance either for lower courts or the orga-
nizations themselves regarding the necessary form of the evidence or the
level of proof required to win the point in court.
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, much of Justice Brennan's opinion
focused on the Court's conclusion that application of the Minnesota Act to
the Jaycees did not violate the male members' freedom of expressive associa-
tion. The Court's ruling also rests on an alternative ground that even if
compelling the Jaycees to admit women results in some incidental curtail-
ment of their protected expression, that result is essential to effectuate the
state's interest.1 87 In reaching this alternative holding, the Court weighed
the state's goal of protecting its female citizens from invidious public dis-
crimination against what it perceived to be either an incidental or speculative
interference with the Jaycees' freedom of speech and concluded that the
state's "compelling interest" justified any impact that admission of women
might have on the Jaycees' freedom of expressive association. 8 8 The ulti-
mate effect of this alternative analysis, coupled with the requirement that the
organization demonstrate impairment of its members' speech, is to eliminate
any possibility that a single sex organization determined to be a place of
public accommodation will succeed in claiming a right of expressive associa-
tion to protect its discriminatory admissions policy.
In the concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor implied that the Court went
farther than necessary to resolve the issue presented and she proposed that
application of her "expressive-commercial dichotomy" would eliminate any
need to apply either a balancing-of-interests test or compelling interest lan-
perhaps, who would stand out among the hustling young businessmen who join the Jaycees-
to peddle sex stereotyping to the Supreme Court. Attitudes about such things are changing on
the bench, especially with a woman justice.").
186. This conjures up an image of the Jaycees or a similar organization conducting a na-
tionwide poll of men and women on issues such as the federal deficit, abortion, school prayer,
voting rights, and nuclear war to determine if there is a significant statistical breakdown ac-
cording to gender.
187. 104 S. Ct. at 3253.
188. Id. The Court's use of this alternative analysis indicates that the individual members
may have been reluctant to conclude that the Jaycees was not the kind of organization entitled
to claim constitutional protection for discrimination under the freedom of association, how-
ever, Justice O'Connor reached this correct conclusion. See supra notes 165-167 and accompa-
nying text.
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guage in resolving future conflicts." 9 Significantly, her analysis avoids any
requirement that the group demonstrate a change in the content or message
of its speech.
Justice O'Connor's alternative framework appropriately focused on the
nature of the organization rather than on the nature of its speech. She ques-
tioned whether the outcome in this case would have been different if the
Jaycees' members had a long history of opposition to public issues believed
by the Court to be espoused by women. 19 0 Because the Court's opinion ap-
peared to suggest this possibility, Justice O'Connor responded that constitu-
tional protection for association should not hinge on the content of the
members' speech or their reasons for holding particular views. 9 Further-
more, her expressive-commercial dichotomy does not distinguish between
protected versus unprotected speech or noncommercial versus commercial
speech. Justice O'Connor did not maintain the Jaycees engaged in commer-
cial or unprotected speech and, therefore, deserved less constitutional shel-
ter.' 92 Justice O'Connor asserted instead that the Jaycees was, in fact, a
commercial organization because its members were involved predominantly
in commercial activities such as recruitment, training, and solicitation. 9
To guide lower courts in drawing the line between expressive and com-
mercial associations, Justice O'Connor suggested the starting point should
be the organization's purpose and the reasons why its members joined.' 94
Other related areas of inquiry indicated by her framework would be whether
the organization primarily furthers members' business interests rather than
their social and recreational interests and whether benefits such as business
contacts and employment opportunities are provided through membership
in the organization. From a policy standpoint, Justice O'Connor's emphasis
on the commercial character of the association is supported by the argument
that exclusion from business-oriented associations (rather than social clubs)
is especially detrimental to women because it denies them access to unique
benefits and opportunities that give men a competitive edge in the market-
189. See Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. at 3258-60 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor sug-
gested that the Court's discussion of Minnesota's compelling interest was simply a balancing-
of-interests test in which the Court weighed the state interest in eliminating gender discrimina-
tion against the Jaycees' interest in freedom of association. Id. at 3258.
190. Id. at 3257.
191. Id. at 3258.
192. Cf United States Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d at 1574 ("The degree of constitu-
tional protection to which certain conduct is entitled becomes progressively greater as the
element of 'speech' or 'expression' grows, and that of 'act' or 'conduct' increases. It becomes
progressively less as the speech begins to appear more 'commercial.' ").
193. Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. at 3261.
194. Id.
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place.195 Significantly, the Jaycees claimed the management training offered
to its male members gave them an advantage in business.' 96 It is unequal
access to this kind of opportunity that may cause substantial harm to women
seeking to advance their professional careers.
On balance, Justice O'Connor's expressive-commercial framework has an
appealing simplicity and may provide a useful analytical tool for determin-
ing when a particular organization warrants first amendment protection.
The "test" suggested by Justice Brennan's opinion, by contrast, is less
straightforward and further complicated by its apparent imposition of a bur-
den on the all-male organization to demonstrate that admission of women
will curtail the members' speech.
197
As a practical matter, the implications of the respective methodologies are
also dissimilar. On the one hand, application of Justice O'Connor's dichot-
omy likely would result in very few organizations of men being compelled to
admit women because it will be extremely difficult for women seeking admis-
sion to prove that the club is "predominantly commercial" in nature. In
essence, only those organizations that can be sufficiently analogized to the
Jaycees in terms of their participation in commercial activities such as re-
cruitment, training, and selling will be affected.' 9
On the other hand, Justice Brennan's analysis has a potentially extensive
195. Id. According to several commentators, the exclusion of women from all-male private
clubs continues to be a tenacious obstacle impeding women from achieving equal opportunity
and status in all facets of contemporary society. It is argued that prestigious men's clubs are
much more than social or recreational facilities because they provide important sources of
business contact and the right connections for members seeking to further their professional
careers. See Bums, supra note 29, at 323; Ginsburg, Women as Full Members of the Club: An
Evolving American Ideal, 6 HUMAN RTs. 1, 19 (1977); Note, Sex Discrimination in Private
Clubs, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 417, 419-20 (1977). A more subtle yet equally damaging result of
private club discrimination is reinforcement of traditional stereotypes about the proper place of
women in society: women do not belong in business or politics, nor do they belong in male
clubs whose members are engaged in such activities. See Bums, supra note 29, at 333. Cf
Tuchman, Why Should I Want to Join a Men's Club?, Wash. Post, Oct. 7, 1983, at A23, col. 2.
Men's clubs seem to me to offer little more attraction [than joining the armed
forces]. . . . I am aware of the argument that women in business and in certain of
the professions need equal access to the clubs because that is where deals and con-
tracts are made over lunch through the old boy network. This may be an exagger-
ated benefit, because my hunch is that the network engages largely in most places, if
not here [at the Cosmos Club], in members absorbing martinis and telling each other
tall stories about their amorous adventures ....
Id.
196. Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. at 3261.
197. This requirement is couched in language that is far from unambiguous and lower
courts may entirely disregard it as dicta. See id. at 3255.
198. Justice O'Connor's argument that the Jaycees was a commercial organization was
facilitated because the bylaws suggest that the purpose of the association was to train young
men for civic and business achievement. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. The con-
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reach. Assuming an all-male association must prove the male views of its
members will be impaired by admission of women, and assuming also that
men and women really do not espouse differing views by virtue of their sexes,
organizations like the Cosmos Club1 99 may be compelled to open their doors
to women members.2 °
III. CONCLUSION
Individuals who initially hailed Roberts v. United States Jaycees as a sig-
nificant advance for women's right to equal access to the nation's clubs may
be disappointed. No widespread integration of single sex organizations
should be expected to occur as a result of the Supreme Court's ruling. Other
state legislatures and courts, however, who are supportive of Minnesota's
goal of providing women with equal access to public goods and services may
stitution of Kiwanis International, another large organization that restricts membership to
men provides that its objectives are:
To give primacy to the human and spiritual, rather than to the material values of
life.
To encourage the daily living of the Golden Rule in all human relationships.
To promote the adoption and the application of higher social, business, and profes-
sional standards.
To develop, by precept and example, a more intelligent, aggressive, and servicable
[sic] citizenship.
To provide, through Kiwanis clubs, a practical means to form enduring friend-
ships, to render altruistic services, and to build better communities.
To cooperate in creating and maintaining that sound public opinion and high ide-
alism which make possible the increase of righteousness, justice, patriotism and good
will.
Kiwanis Club v. Board of Trustees, 83 Misc. 2d 1075, 1077, 374 N.Y.S.2d 265, 267 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1975) (concluding that these "objectives certainly cannot be construed, on their face, as
having any commercial implications"), aft'd, 52 A.D.2d 906, 383 N.Y.S.2d 383 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1976), affid, 41 N.Y.2d 1034, 363 N.E.2d 1378, 395 N.Y.S.2d 633 (N.Y. 1977).
199. The Cosmos Club, located at 2121 Massachusetts Avenue in Washington, D.C., was
organized in 1878 and its bylaws declare that:
This Club shall be composed of men
(a) Who have done meritorious original work in science, literature, or the arts; or
(b) Who, though not professionally occupied in science, literature, or the arts, are
well known to be cultivated in some field thereof; or
(c) Who are recognized as distinguished in a learned profession or in public
service.
Extract from the Bylaws, Cosmos Club List of Members (Oct. 9, 1965). The 3,000 member
Cosmos Club, "one of the nation's most prestigious clubs," has staunchly refused on three
occasions over the last fifteen years to yield to internal pressure to allow women to be mem-
bers. Weiser, Proposal to Admit Women Is Agitating Cosmos Club, Wash. Post, Nov. 15, 1980,
at Al, col. 3.
200. According to the club's bylaws, female guests of male members or members' widows
are allowed to use the Club's facilities and in 1973 the Club approved an amendment permit-
ting women guests to enter the club through the front door. Weiser, supra note 199, at All,
col. 2.
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be encouraged by Jaycees to attack the problem of gender discrimination in
their states.
Significantly, Jaycees did not resolve the extent to which freedom of asso-
ciation will protect organizations that discriminate on the basis of sex in
their membership practices. On the one hand, truly private clubs, as defined
by state legislatures and courts, will be immune from the Jaycees holding for
the reason the Supreme Court did not decide the issue whether a private club
has a right to discriminate that is protected by the freedom of expressive
association. On the other hand, it seems clear that where an allegedly pri-
vate club is found to be a place of public accommodation by a state court,
the freedom of expressive association will not shield it from state sanctions
unless it demonstrates by a substantial showing that the content or message
of its speech will be impaired by the admission of women. The Court's im-
position of this requirement is problematic and it remains for future courts
to decide how, if at all, it is to be applied. Initially, the kinds of organiza-
tions most likely to be affected by the Supreme Court's (either Justice Bren-
nan's or Justice O'Connor's) analysis are other national organizations with
local chapters that can be analogized to the Jaycees in terms of size, absence
of selective membership criteria, and commercial character. The potential
reach of Justice Brennan's opinion, however, is implicitly tempered by the
fact that theoretically the Court's "test" does not apply until a state court
determines the organization is not a private club but a place of public accom-
modation. The fate of the nation's private and quasi-private clubs, therefore,
will be controlled to a great extent by state legislatures and courts.
Ann H. Jameson
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